



**Department of Supervision, Central Office  
Cyber Security & IT Risk (CSITE) Group**

**CONFIDENTIAL**

**Advisory 2\_COVID-19**

**Dated: March 23, 2020**

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Supervised Entities (SEs) may please refer to the general guidance prescribed vide Advisory\_COVID-19 dated March 13, 2020. In view of recent developments, it may be necessary for SEs to work with minimal strength and make provisions for key personnel to work from home/remote location. In doing so, SEs are advised to take necessary precautions to ensure that they meet their business continuity and cyber security objectives including the following:

- i. Confidential/ sensitive data including customer data must be secured at all times. SEs may regulate the use of unconventional communication channels (such as mobile messaging applications) for official communication, considering the attendant data leak implications.
- ii. All access to employees/ third-party personnel to the bank's IT systems must be secure.
- iii. Detective systems/ mechanisms such as log monitoring/ Security Operations Centre, fraud risk (transaction) monitoring, performance monitoring, etc. must operate at the highest level of capabilities necessary to detect and alert abnormal events/ behaviour.
- iv. Arrangements may be made to ensure incident response mechanisms possess adequate redundant capabilities by putting in place standby (even if off-site) incident response teams.
- v. SEs may ensure that digital banking channels are adequately equipped to handle any increase in transaction volumes.
- vi. Customers shall be adequately sensitised to exercise vigilance against social engineering attempts, particularly while undertaking digital banking transactions.

### **Securing Payment Ecosystem**

- vii. With reference to our earlier instructions on securing the payment ecosystem, SEs are advised to monitor all payment transactions, especially cross border transactions.
- viii. SEs are urged to ensure that reconciliation process is robust across all payment systems and channels.
- ix. In this connection, a reference is also invited to NPCI Advisory NPCI/2019-20/RMD 231 dated February 10, 2020 (addressed to all members of Rupay and NFS). SEs are advised to put in place necessary measures, as applicable, for all the cards issued.

### **CERT-In Threat Intel**

- x. Based on the threat intelligence received from CERT-In, it is gathered that threat actors are leveraging the COVID-19 pandemic for their own notorious gains. Details are given in the **Annex**.
- xi. Many SEs would be already subscribing to the threat intelligence from Cert-In. SEs that are yet to subscribe to the threat intelligence from CERT-In are encouraged to subscribe directly. They may contact CERT-In on [incident@cert-in.org.in](mailto:incident@cert-in.org.in) for the same.
- xii. SEs may take note of the TLP coding of the threat intelligence and use the content with strict confidentiality for securing their environment.
- xiii. Some of the best practice and recommendations are:
  - a) The majority of the infections are primarily introduced via phishing emails, malicious adverts on websites, and third-party apps and programs. Hence, thoughtfully designed security awareness campaigns that stress the avoidance of clicking on links and attachments in email, can establish an essential pillar of defence.
  - b) Monitor Connection attempts towards the listed domains. The list may include compromised domains /IP resources as well. Blocking the domains/IPs is solely

the recipient responsibility after diligently verifying them without impacting the operations.

- c) Allow remote access to the organization's network strictly with multi-factor authentication.
- d) Systems having antivirus and a malware protection program on it and making sure they are always up to date with latest signatures.
- e) Administrators applying strict application whitelisting, blocking unused ports, turning off unused services, and monitoring outgoing traffic to prevent infections from occurring.
- f) Checking all services and devices for remote access for updates of firmware and security patches. Internet-facing open ports of remote-control services are a key target for attacks.

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**Annex**

\*\*\*\*\***CERT-In –THREAT Intel**\*\*\*\*\*  
(TLP:Amber)

**Onset of Coronavirus Themed Attacks: End of February 2020**

Tactics and Attack Procedures Involved:

Strategies to lure victims the threat actors devise following new strategies to target victims with scams or malware campaigns:

- Using promotional codes
- Coronavirus Maps distributing instances of AZORult info stealer
- 'COVID19' as discount codes used by different hacking groups to promote their goods (malicious malware or exploit tools) for financial gain being sold over dark net

Malware Families Related to Covid-19:

- AGENT TESLA
- TRICKBOT
- LOKIBOT
- TRICKYMOUSE
- VICIOUS PANDA CAMPAIGN
- AZORULT
- CRIMSON RAT
- COVIDLOCK

A list of reported IOC's is listed for your perusal and action.

\*\*\*\*\***IOC START**\*\*\*\*\*

URLs:

- hxxps://healing-yui223.com/cd[.]php
- hxxps://www.schooluniformtrading[.]com[.]au/cdcgov/files/
- hxxps://onthefx[.]com/cd[.]php
- hxxps://urbanandruraldesign[.]com[.]au/cdcgov/files

hxxps://gocycle[.]com[.]au/cdcgov/files/  
hxxps://185[.]234.73.125/wMB03o/Wx9u79.php  
hxxps://45.128.134.14/C821al/vc2Tmy.php?  
hxxp://198.23.200[.]241/~power13/.xoiaspxo/fre.php

IPs:

150[.]95[.]52[.]104  
118[.]127[.]3[.]247  
153[.]120[.]181[.]196  
112[.]140[.]180[.]26  
13[.]239[.]26[.]132  
23[.]19[.]227[.]235  
45[.]128[.]134[.]14  
198[.]23[.]200[.]241  
123[.]161[.]61[.]55  
145[.]239[.]23[.]7  
192[.]35[.]177[.]64  
95[.]179[.]242[.]6  
95[.]179[.]242[.]27  
199[.]247[.]25[.]102  
95[.]179[.]210[.]61  
95[.]179[.]156[.]97  
107[.]175[.]64[.]209  
64[.]188[.]25[.]205

HASHES:

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b67d764c981a298fa2bb14ca7faffc68ec30ad34380ad8a92911b2350104e748

DOMAINS:

Postmaster[ @ ]mallinckrodt[.]xyz  
brentpaul403[ @ ]yandex[.]ru  
cdc-gov[.]org

cdcgov[.]org  
insiderppe[.]cloudapp.net  
kbfvzoboss.bid/alien/fre.php  
cloud-security.ggpht[.]ml  
dw.adyboh[.]com  
wy.adyboh[.]com  
feb.kkooppt[.]com  
compdate.my03[.]com  
jocoly.esvnpe[.]com  
bmy.hqoohoa[.]com  
bur.vueleslie[.]com  
wind.windmilledrops[.]com

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